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Abstract
This paper articulates the essentially philosophical character of human ecology. 
The first section argues that the often-noted concern of human ecology for both 
sustainability and equity is best understood as a concern to help humans implicated 
in problematic human–environment interactions to identify how to refashion these 
interactions so as to enable a more sustainable balance between the moral claims of 
others and their own needs and desires. Human ecology is therefore governed by a 
unitary practical interest in facilitating a more sustainable balance between virtue 
and happiness—living well in Aristotle’s sense. If this is so, then human ecology 
must be done, in certain phases of its practice, as philosophy. The second section then 
illustrates how this general conception applies to and shapes the investigation of a 
concrete issue—consumption—particularly in first world economies. It also shows 
how, given this conception of human ecology as philosophy, this issue is not just one 
important target of investigation alongside others but the central human ecological 
topic. Finally, the third section argues that human ecology, done as philosophy, also 
requires grounding in philosophy. Specifically, it needs a general account of what it 
is to be the rational animals we humans are since only this can give action-guiding 
content to the idea of living well without tendentiously prescribing any specific 
form of life. In conclusion, it is argued that the philosophical character of human 
ecology explains what it means to describe it as a multi-, inter-, trans-, and even 
adisciplinary fusion of biological and social sciences.
Keywords: consumption, critical theory, living well, philosophy, rationality, 
sustainablity 
Introduction
Since its inception as “a fusion of biological and social sciences in the early 
twentieth century,” (Dyball, 2010, p. 273) human ecology has been variously 
described as (a) multidisciplinary—in that it draws upon the insights of 
different disciplines—; (b) interdisciplinary—in that it integrates the insights 
of other disciplines into a whole greater than the sum of its parts—; and 
1 Author contact: carleton.christensen@anu.edu.au.
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(c) transdisciplinary—beyond all disciplines and therefore adisciplinary, hence 
not really a discipline at all. But what does it mean to characterize human ecology 
in these successively more radical terms? They are, I believe, inchoate attempts 
to articulate the following thesis: Human ecology must be done, in certain 
phases of its practice, as philosophy and indeed is crucially reliant on strictly 
philosophical reflection.2 Only by grounding human ecology as philosophy (as 
discussed in Section 1) and in philosophy (as discussed in Section 3) can one 
see what it is to genuinely ‘fuse’ natural and social scientific disciplines in a 
coherent unity which explains why it has been successively characterized as 
multi-, inter-, trans-, and ultimately adisciplinary. Thereby human ecology 
is strengthened both theoretically and practically: theoretically, in that one 
has a clearer understanding of what, as a human ecologist, one’s task is; and 
practically, in that one sees how ambitious and politically relevant the task is.
Inevitably, then, much of this paper will work in the language of philosophy, 
with which many readers of Human Ecology Review will not be familiar. This 
paper is, however, envisaged as the first in a series in the course of which the 
philosophical dimensions and presuppositions of human ecology will be further 
spelled out. This will progressively make the philosophical terminology and 
style employed here more accessible to readers less familiar with philosophy 
in general.
The character of human ecology as practically 
interested
Let the object domain of a form of inquiry be the class of entities with which 
this form of inquiry is essentially concerned. An object domain is thus a class 
of entities in their capacity as constituted in such a way that they can occur in 
the kinds of relation which a particular form of theoretical inquiry essentially 
seeks to comprehend. Thus, physics has as its object domain a class of entities 
which are so constituted as to stand in distinctively physical relations, that is, 
causal interactions of the kind in which an entity is implicated by virtue of 
having physical properties. Similarly, the historiography of, say, Germany in 
the 19th century has as its object domain a class of entities so constituted as to 
stand in historical relations, specifically those pertaining to German history of 
the 19th century. Finally, mathematics has as its object domain a class of entities 
so constituted as to stand in distinctively mathematical relations.3
2 Of course, in saying this, I mean much more than that human ecology should avail itself of the 
philosophical tradition.
3 Note that I am deliberately leaving open what physical, German-historical, and mathematical properties 
are. This is because I want to allow that what one understands by a physical, historical, or mathematical 
property may evolve.
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“Human ecology is about the interrelationships between humans, their cultures 
and their ecosystems” (Dyball, 2010, p.  273). In other words, it investigates 
the complex web of causal relations which exist between human beings, their 
cultural and social practices, and the ecosystems in which these are embedded. 
We may therefore say that its object domain is the class of human–environment 
interactions. More precisely, it is the class of entities implicated in these 
interactions by virtue of having those properties or standing in those relations 
which shape these interactions. There is, however, a crucial difference between 
this object domain and those of physics, historiography, and mathematics. The 
object domain of physics is understood to be unified by natural laws. It is the 
defining task of physics to find these laws. The object domain of a particular form 
of historiography, for example, of Germany in the 19th century, is not unified 
in this sense. Nonetheless, this domain contains items which are intrinsically 
significant,4 that is, significant in the sense that they are understood to have made 
Germany and Germans what they are today. And understanding how Germany 
and the Germans have become what they are is something not, or at least not 
just, practically useful, in that it helps us to deal with Germany and Germans;5 it 
is interesting in its own right. So here, too, something unifies the object domain, 
making it a worthy object of investigation in its own right: the idea of there 
being a coherent story to tell about how an important country, culture, and 
people have emerged as what they are today.6 Finally, the object domain of any 
particular kind of mathematics is understood to be unified by a set of axiomatic 
principles constitutive of the kind of mathematical entity at issue. It is the task of 
any given branch of mathematics to uncover the relevant set of principles—that 
underlying unity definitive of an object domain which is perhaps the example 
par excellence of something worth knowing for its own sake.
But the object domain of human ecology is not like this. It is not presumed to 
possess an underlying unity, whether of natural law, narrative significance, or 
axiomatic principle. Rather, it is understood to be a motley affair whose unity 
lies in the fact that human–environment interactions have become practically 
problematic. In other words, the object domain of human ecology is picked 
out by a practical interest underpinned by concern about human–environment 
interactions rather than by a theoretical interest affectively underpinned by 
what Aristotle called wonder (thaumazein).7 In this regard, human ecology is 
4 Obviously, not everything which happened in Germany in the 19th century is of historical interest, 
hence belongs to the object domain of that form of historical inquiry which is the historiography of Germany 
in the 19th century.
5 It is in fact arguable whether such historical knowledge is in this way ‘useful’ at all.
6 It is worth noting that something at least analogous to such narrative unity can be found in disciplines 
which are not so-called Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). Thus, the object domains of natural history, the 
evolution of the Earth, etc. are presumed to possess an at least quasi-narrative unity.
7 Wonder is to be distinguished from mere curiosity, however intellectual, because it involves awe, hence 
recognition of value—beauty, elegance, simplicity, or perhaps, nobility, heroism, creativity, etc. Such 
recognition of value can be entirely absent from curiosity, for which reason one can speak of a prurient 
curiosity but not of a prurient wonder.
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like engineering or rather the applied science which underpins engineering; 
for example, research undertaken in order to determine how the reproductive 
system works so as then to engineer safe and effective means of contraception.
There is, however, also a crucial difference: the object domain of a particular 
form of applied science is any kind of causal interaction by understanding 
which one might potentially achieve, through the engineering of appropriate 
technological solutions, a specific human benefit. So the practical interest 
at issue here is purely prudential in the sense that it is a concern to know 
how certain things work for the sake of identifying, or at least enabling the 
identification of, effective technological means of bringing about certain results 
beneficial to us. By contrast, the practical interest which leads one to select 
human–environment interactions as one’s domain of theoretical investigation 
is not simply prudential—as if one were concerned merely to understand these 
interactions simply in order to devise better ways of protecting and maintaining 
ecosystems of value to us.8 This interest is also ethical: one is concerned to 
understand these systems in order to derive just ways of protecting and 
maintaining ecosystems of value to us.9 In one’s account of human–environment 
interactions, one is also concerned to identify their ethical implications and 
consequences for those morally considerable beings; in particular, for those 
other human beings implicated in and affected by them.
If, however, the object domain definitive of human ecology is not intrinsically 
unified in the sense in which those of physics, history, or mathematics are, 
then human ecology can no more be pursued in purely disinterested, merely 
theoretical fashion than can engineering or applied science. This does not mean, 
of course, that an individual human ecologist might not practice the trade out of 
mere intellectual curiosity. The point here concerns the institution or cognitive 
practice of human ecology, not individual human ecologists. If the institution or 
cognitive practice of human ecology were merely an exercise in knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake, then, in contrast to physics, historiography, or mathematics, 
it would be merely entertaining, a hobby, in the manner of, say, train-spotting. 
No doubt train-spotting can and perhaps does have its congresses and journals, 
its experts and keynote speakers. Even so, it remains a diversion. By contrast, 
physics seeks to know the innermost lawfulness of the physical, and this is 
something truly wondrous. This innermost lawfulness makes the knowledge 
gained by physics something worthwhile, something valuable and valued, in 
a way in which the knowledge gained in train-spotting is not. In this sense, 
then, physics is serious in a way train-spotting is not. Independently of the 
8 Note that the phrase ‘of value’ allows that the value in question may not be simply prudential but, 
say, aesthetic.
9 Veronica Bullock has pointed out to me in conversation that the same might well be true of the science of 
conserving artefacts and other cultural items for exhibition.
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motivations of any individual physicist, physics is a cognitive practice embedded 
in and sustained by the shared social conviction that what it accomplishes is 
valuable in and of itself. It is thus a cognitive practice essentially characterized 
by the normativized collective belief, hence normative expectation, that one 
does physics because one is intellectually curious about a presumed innermost 
lawfulness of the physical.
So, too, with human ecology: it is serious in a way train-spotting is not. 
Independently of the motivations of any individual human ecologist, it is a 
cognitive practice embedded in and sustained by the normativized collective 
belief that what it accomplishes is valuable, not in and of itself, but for practical 
reasons—it permits us to understand phenomena with critical prudential and 
ethical consequences. It is thus a cognitive practice essentially characterized 
by the normative expectation that one engages in human ecology because one 
is concerned about these prudential and ethical consequences. Evidently, if 
this is so, then as a rule human ecologists will pursue human ecology out of 
a combined prudential and ethical concern. As a rule, one cannot do human 
ecology disinterestedly, out of mere intellectual curiosity.
This response to one objection intimates the reply to another. One might grant 
that human ecology is defined by an essentially practical interest in order then 
to object that this practical interest might be merely prudential. It is, after all, 
possible that someone might naively believe that current human–environment 
interactions do not harm any morally considerable third party but merely 
threaten the individuals and societies which engage in them. Such a person 
would then engage in human ecology merely for prudential reasons. But as 
with the possibility of doing human ecology out of mere curiosity, so, too, 
with this one: we are discussing the institution or practice of human ecology, 
not the psychology of the individuals who practice it. Human ecology is a 
cognitive practice which is essentially structured by the normativized collective 
expectation that one engage in it out of a concern not just for the prudential but 
also for the ethical consequences of human–environment interactions. To be 
what counts as a good, effective human ecologist, one therefore needs as a rule 
this motivation and when, exceptionally, one does not, one is not doing human 
ecology properly.
At this point, a crucial question arises: If human ecology is constituted by a 
practical interest both prudential and ethical in a way in which the practical 
interest of applied science is not, then how do these two dimensions stand to 
one another? Surely they do not sit indifferently and contingently alongside 
one another but rather are intimately bound up with one another. In some way, 
they must surely form an inseparable unity. But what could this mean? Through 
interacting with the environment humans seek to satisfy various needs or 
desires. At the same time, they typically know any such interaction to stand, 
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like any human action, under the moral obligation that it not be undertaken 
in a fashion which disregards the interests of morally considerable beings 
potentially affected by it. So any human being, simply in virtue of standing, 
hence knowing him- or herself to stand, under this moral obligation confronts 
the task of finding some way to mediate between the prudential and the ethical, 
that is, to find some way in which one can satisfy need and desire while fulfilling 
the requirements of ethics and vice versa.
Regularly and reliably accomplishing this mediation in the conduct of one’s 
affairs is what Aristotle called living well.10 It follows trivially from this 
characterization of living well that a life lived well—the good life—is neither 
simply virtuous nor simply happy, but rather both at once. Relatedly, the good 
person is not simply someone who sacrifices desire to ethics, but rather someone 
who has an accurate sense of their own entitlement to desire satisfaction. 
Moreover, living well in this sense, that is, existing as a process of mediating 
ethics and desire with one another, is objective happiness—objective in the 
sense that all human beings, unless they are conscienceless psychopaths, would 
acknowledge it as the optimal way to live, even if they do not regard themselves 
as having the moral character required for being able to live in this manner. 
Evidently, living well is not happiness in the sense of feeling good, in particular, 
about oneself. It is thus not what these days is called well-being. Rather, it is 
happiness in the sense of contentment and this is a state one can be in even 
though one is not living in the most comfortable or commodious of conditions 
and even though one knows one has not achieved all one could have.11
This conception of living well has both internal psychological and external 
social and biophysical implications: as a rule, if not always, human beings 
must be psychologically disposed to seek this mediation in the conduct of their 
affairs. Equally, their external situation, which comprises both the social and 
the natural circumstances under which they live, must be such as to permit 
them regularly to accomplish this mediation. This yields two further important 
notions: firstly, one is a good person, that is, of good moral character, insofar as 
one is psychologically disposed to living well. Secondly, a society is a good one 
insofar as it enables individuals to develop and realize good moral character. 
Note that this will involve not only appropriate practices of character formation 
and the right social relations, it will also require society to have an appropriate 
relation to its biophysical environment. A good society is one which enables 
seekers of happiness to be upright, lovers of justice happy, across psychological, 
social, and natural dimensions.
10 Specifically, it is what he called sôphrosynê—see Aristotle (2011/1941, 1140b12).
11 It is, for example, quite possible to be happy in this sense—content, at peace with oneself and the 
world—even in a hospice.
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At this point, we may venture the following speculative thought: In the 
practical interest constitutive of human ecology the prudential and the ethical 
are indeed inseparably bound up with one another and they are so because 
this interest, properly understood, lies not just in listing the various ways in 
which the human–environment interaction under investigation is prudentially 
unwise and/or morally wrong, but rather in exploring these ways in their 
unity as detracting from living well. And the point of thus exploring how the 
human–environment interaction under investigation undermines living well is 
to determine how this human–environment interaction could be so rearranged 
that it enables, for those who engage in it, a better realization of living well.
At first sight, this might seem little more than the anodyne point that human 
ecology seeks, through the knowledge it provides, to contribute to so-called 
“win/win” solutions. There is, however, more meat to the idea than this. Firstly, 
from the substantive perspective of what human ecology accomplishes, it 
possess a hidden depth of content. It is often hard to determine just how, in the 
concrete circumstances, one might reorder a human–environment interaction so 
as to mediate as well as possible in the circumstances between ethics and desire. 
In particular, what often makes this so hard is that the specific desire at issue 
is itself dysfunctional, hence is itself what must change; there is no clever way 
to rearrange things which would permit desire to be satisfied without injustice. 
This means that human ecology is committed by its constitutive practical interest 
to exploring a human–environment interaction with a view to determining how 
the specific desires, hence underlying affective dispositions,12 of those engaged 
in the interaction might be reconfigured to make them more conducive to living 
well. In other words, since desires and affective dispositions are the springs of 
purposive behavior and action, human ecology is committed to exploring the 
possibilities of so-called behavioral change in quite radical fashion, up to and 
including the study of how, in the concrete circumstances, those involved in 
problematic interaction might be brought not to desire and not to feel in the 
manner which drives this interaction. Evidently, this points to the need for an 
account of what desire and affective disposition essentially are. In particular, it 
points to the need to investigate first whether human beings have them under 
their rational control, such that they can reconfigure their patterns of desire and 
affect in reflective fashion; and then, if this is so, under what conditions and in 
what way such rational control is effectively exercised.13
12 By an affective disposition I mean a capacity to be affected in some way, either viscerally (hunger, pain 
or pleasure) or emotionally (grief or joy, amused or displeased, etc.). Affective dispositions in this sense make 
it possible to have desires: I desire to eat because I am hungry, I desire to help a certain person because I 
love her—or indeed perhaps because I would feel ashamed of myself if I did not help. The capacity for such 
complex emotions as guilt and self-respect, shame and self-esteem (which pairs are not to be confused with 
one another!) are extremely important affective dispositions.
13 More will be said below, particularly in Section 3, about the nature of this investigation.
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Secondly, also from the methodological perspective of how human ecology 
accomplishes what it accomplishes, this idea possesses a hidden depth of 
content. The constitutive practical interest of human ecology impacts upon 
how it individuates the human–environment interactions with which it deals. 
Obviously, if one is investigating a problematic human–environment interaction 
not simply in order to list its prudentially and ethically negative consequences 
but also in order to determine how it measures up as enabling those who engage 
in it to live well, then one cannot be investigating this interaction in isolation. 
Identifying something which would appropriately recognize the interests of all 
involved14 will clearly require one to see this interaction in both its biophysical 
and its socioeconomic, political, cultural, and historical context. So from the 
outset, the human–environment interaction under investigation is picked out 
as a part belonging to (perhaps larger parts of) a biophysical, socioeconomic, 
cultural, and historical whole—to an entire form of human life. Furthermore, 
since human ecology is practically and not merely theoretically interested, this 
form of life is either directly or indirectly our own. Australian human ecologists 
could, for example, be investigating Filipino fishing practices, or, in a more 
historical mode, the land management practices of Australian Aboriginals prior 
to European colonization. Either way, as human ecologists they are investigating 
such human–environment interactions because they believe that understanding 
them is relevant to understanding and better dealing with their own current 
human–environment interactions, understood as aspects or parts of their own 
current form of life.
This shows the widely acknowledged holism (Dyball, 2010, p.  1) of human 
ecology to have a distinctive character which distances it from its origins in 
ecology as a natural science and permits it to reach out to the social sciences. 
I have claimed that the practical interest constitutive of human ecology is not 
simply the sum of two concerns contingently lumped together, on the one hand, 
a concern to ascertain what prudentially problematic features a given human–
environment interaction might have, and on the other, a concern to ascertain 
what its ethically problematic features might be. Rather, I have suggested that 
these twin concerns are but aspects or dimensions of the one deeper practical 
interest in ascertaining how concretely the human–environment interaction 
does or does not facilitate living well. And by an understanding of how 
concretely a particular kind of engagement with the world does and does not 
facilitate living well on the part of those thus engaged, I do not mean simply 
knowledge of certain superficially observable features of the engagement as 
prudentially or ethically bad. Rather, I mean a grasp of how things actually 
are in their character as less than they might potentially be. To understand 
how concretely a particular kind of engagement with the world does and does 
14 This is, of course, the really substantive idea behind talk of a “win/win” solution.
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not facilitate living well on the part of those engaged in it is thus to grasp 
what it is actually in essential relation to an unrealized potential inherent to it. 
Such understanding is what human ecology must aim at if it is governed by a 
genuinely practical interest in knowing how a human–environment interaction 
does or does not facilitate living well—knowing how in a sense which insinuates 
knowing what to concretely do in response to the impediments to living well 
the human ecologist discerns.
Since, however, knowledge in this strong sense of how a particular human–
environment interaction impedes living well does not leap out at the 
investigator—it is not superficially obvious in the way in which, say, isolated 
moral blemishes can be—human ecology is defined by a deep and complex 
task. It seeks not just to list problematic features of the human–environment 
interaction it is investigating; it also seeks to identify practically available 
opportunities for developing out of this interaction something which better 
approximates to living well—better approximates in that it better gives all 
morally considerable parties their due, hence better balances ethics and desire. 
Accomplishing this must be a process in which, through ongoing exploration of 
and negotiation with the context, the investigation lets the human–environment 
interaction at issue appear in its character as a lesser version of something 
better. Evidently, a crucial resource in the development of this are the human 
beings engaged in or affected by the interaction—the stakeholders. Insofar as 
human ecology is ultimately concerned with understanding how concretely a 
particular human–environment interaction does and does not facilitate living 
well, hence must ascertain concretely how things might be better, it must draw 
upon the knowledge and experience of those engaged in and affected by it. 
It must make them, to some extent, participants in the investigation.
This immediately gives to human ecology an inherently critical character, in the 
sense intended by such critical theorists as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
and Herbert Marcuse. By critical theory, these thinkers meant a theoretical 
practice which was inherently evaluative: to engage in it was not simply to come 
up with claims about how things are from which one could only proceed to 
claims about how they might be better by importing normative and axiological 
premises from outside. Rather, to engage in it was to come up with claims 
about members of the object domain which in and of themselves entailed a 
certain kind of evaluation of these members. To investigate phenomena from the 
perspective of whether and in what ways they enable or disable living well is, 
as we have seen, to set oneself the task of exploring them in such a manner that 
they progressively reveal themselves as aspects of a form of life which would be 
better in such and such ways. The cognitive goal is to reveal the form of life of 
which these phenomena are parts not just in its actuality or positivity—what 
it factually is—but also and primarily in its potentiality or negativity—what 
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it is not but could be. Human ecology seeks ultimately to move beyond merely 
establishing what is problematic in a human–environment interaction in order 
to glimpse that potential form of life relative to which the actual one appears 
as less adequate by virtue of containing this human–environment interaction.
An example will make this clearer: Historians can investigate the interaction 
between a Roman patrician and his Greek tutor in straightforwardly positive 
fashion, noting, for example, that the latter is a slave whom the former can 
and often does treat as a mere thing to be used, whom, however, the former 
does and indeed must treat with deference when learning from him. But 
precisely for this reason we intuitively recognize that this characterization 
leaves something unsaid, namely, that there is something cognitively dissonant 
about the interaction in relation to the patrician’s behavior overall: how the 
patrician behaves when learning shows that the tutor is not a mere thing to be 
used, hence should not be a slave. Should our historians go on to articulate this, 
they would obviously be assessing the interaction. And their assessment would 
be at least ethical: these historians would be applying the general norm that 
something capable of teaching should never be treated simply as a means but 
always also as an end in itself. Crucially, they would be assuming that this norm 
were something acknowledged not just by them themselves but also by the 
patrician—implicitly acknowledged in the way the latter behaves when being 
taught. Just this, however, means that the historians’ primary assessment would 
be an ontological one: From the outset, they would have picked the patrician and 
his behavior out as something to which this norm applies, hence from the outset 
they are seeing the actual interaction as inherently pointing towards a not-yet-
realized one in which those involved have received the due the character of 
their interaction implies—a counterfactual interaction, therefore, in which the 
slave would not be a slave. This would be to assess the actual interaction as (part 
of) an imperfect form of living well, whereby the notion of living well would 
serve as a standard in the ontological sense that it defines a possibility inherent 
in the actual interaction of which this interaction is a suboptimal realization.
The study of consumption and the critique of 
consumerism
I want now to illustrate how the general conception just sketched applies to and 
shapes the investigation of a concrete issue. I have chosen this issue because, as 
we shall see towards the end of this section, when human ecology is conceived as 
inherently philosophical in the manner described in Section 1, this issue shows 
itself to be not so much just one important target of investigation alongside 
others but, in a sense to be explained, the central human ecological topic.
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It is widely acknowledged that problems of sustainability have much to do with 
the character, quantity, and rate of consumption, particularly in first world 
economies. In the literature on consumption and consumerism there are two 
broad traditions, each strong where the other is weak. On the one hand, there is 
a tradition that starts from the assumption that consumption is a process through 
which individuals not merely satisfy needs and desires, but also signal to others 
such things as status, power, identity, and/or individuality. Acknowledgment 
by others of the status, power, identity, or individuality thereby signaled is 
then construed as confirming individuals in their own sense of self, hence 
as a source of their self-esteem. Often, the signaling role of consumption is 
seen as manipulable through advertising by vested interests. When it is thus 
manipulated, consumption becomes consumerism, with consequences bad 
for consumers themselves: loss of autonomy, ‘inauthentic’ selfhood, and the 
absence of ‘true’ happiness. Evidently, this tradition, which reaches from 
Thorstein Veblen (1994/1899) through J.  K.  Galbraith (1958), Vance Packard 
(1957), and Erich Fromm (1976) to Juliet Schor (1998) and Clive Hamilton and 
Richard Denniss (2005), seeks not just an account of consumption but a critique 
of consumerism.
On the other hand, there is a tradition which proceeds ethnographically, 
examining diverse practices of consumption in order to determine what exactly 
individual consumers do when they use consumer goods and services, hence 
why they purchase them. This tradition ascertains that consumers frequently 
use consumer goods and services in such spontaneous and creative ways that 
no advertiser could anticipate this use. To this extent, and in contrast to what 
many in the first tradition maintain, the desires driving consumption cannot 
be literally manufactured by producers through marketing. Furthermore, no 
obvious sense emerges in which consumption in late modern capitalist societies 
is bad for consumers themselves, hence consumerist. The second tradition thus 
provides no basis for the kind of critique characteristic of the first. Indeed, 
sometimes this second tradition construes ostensibly consumerist consumption 
positively, as providing opportunities for creative self-expression and fantasy—
see Bauman (2000, 2001) and Campbell (1987). Other representatives of the 
second, noncritical tradition include Daniel Miller (2001), Sophie Woodward 
(Miller & Woodward 2012), Richard Wilk (2001), and, in a different way, 
Elizabeth Shove (2003; and Shove et al. 2009).
The second tradition stands on empirically stronger ground: most forms of 
consumption and consumer do not correspond to the picture painted of them 
by the first tradition. In fact, the first tradition illicitly takes a particular 
form of consumption—conspicuous consumption—as representative of 
all consumption. Furthermore, it paints a distorted picture of conspicuous 
consumption. In particular, it construes the conspicuous consumer as a slave 
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of advertising whose desire for a product is just as much manufactured by the 
producer through advertising as the product itself. This “productivist” picture 
of consumption grossly misrepresents how advertising actually works. Yet 
there is a certain legitimacy to the concern of many within the first tradition 
to identify a sense in which contemporary consumption is consumerist, that is, 
bad not just for certain third parties but for consumers themselves. If it can be 
shown that such consumption is not truly in the interest of those who engage in 
it, then one will have uncovered a powerful motivation for behavioral change. 
This is evidently an attractive feature for those seeking more sustainable kinds, 
quantities, and speeds of consumption. One would like, therefore, to preserve 
this critical dimension of (much of) the first tradition even as one preserves the 
empirical accuracy of the second. A synthesis of the two traditions is needed.
Recall now the account implicit in Aristotle of the formal structure of living 
well: To live well is to reliably and regularly, if not necessarily always, mediate 
successfully between ethics and desire, such that as a rule the demands of the one 
are reconciled with the demands of the other. Clearly, being able to live well in 
this sense is a function both of one’s internal desires and general moral character 
and of one’s external social and natural circumstances. This provides a clue as 
to how one might interpret practices of consumption in late modern consumer 
capitalist society as “consumerist,” that is, bad for consumers themselves even 
though such consumers might very well enjoy the fruits of consumer society 
and even though they are so little manipulated by advertisers that they display 
a relative autonomy in relation to the blandishments of marketing. For one can 
imagine a situation in which the totality of consumption practices becomes 
dysfunctional in the sense that although this totality might provide a vast 
choice of high-quality, low-cost opportunities for consumption, the practices of 
production and distribution needed to sustain this totality involve such speed, 
change, labor intensity, temporal fragmentation, and social isolation that the 
capacity for living well is impaired. One needs, for example, to go somewhere 
and would prefer to use public transport, perhaps because it is environmentally 
friendlier, hence ethically better, and moreover gives one the chance to read, 
hence is prudentially better. Unfortunately, one has so much to do, and the 
public transport system is so inconvenient that one has no choice but to make 
the short-term rational but long-term irrational decision of traveling by car. 
Evidently, if such suboptimality is a feature of practical decision-making across 
many different contexts and individuals, then the capacity of individuals 
collectively to steer the totality of consumption and production practices will 
be undermined. The political life of this totality can then only be maintained as 
a comforting illusion.
There thus lies in this situation of dissonance a possible collective motive for 
the reorganization of the spheres of consumption and production: less choice of 
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low-cost, high-quality goods and services in favor of more time for the kind of 
reflectiveness, the social and political engagement, and indeed the overall inner 
composure15 which fully rational decision-making, hence living well, requires. 
Those interested in less choice of low-cost, high-quality goods and services for 
environmental reasons can therefore exploit this collective dissonance in an 
argument to the effect that in reality, however advantageous and pleasurable 
current practices of consumption may be in the short term, in the longer term 
the kind of lifestyle, and in particular workstyle, they embody is not really 
worthwhile because it tends to rob us of crucial dimensions of living well: 
reflectiveness, social and political engagement, and inner composure. Much 
contemporary consumption is indeed consumerist in the sense desired and the 
demonstration that it is so is a powerful argument for social change. The harder 
we have to work in order to maintain such consumption the more powerful this 
argument will become.
Two important points follow from this sketch of how to provide an account 
of consumption that is critical without empirical distortion. Firstly, it requires 
one to investigate consumption in its relation to production, that is, to 
practices of work. It discloses the dimension of work as something one needs 
to investigate in order to understand the quality of life in consumer capitalist 
society and in so doing it reveals this dimension as a possible source of motives 
for social change, in particular, change towards a less consumerist, hence more 
sustainable, organization of work and play. All sorts of notions now become 
targets of critical scrutiny, in particular those associated with the kind of work 
increasingly demanded by the consumer society, for example, productivity or 
efficiency, performance, excellence, flexibility, and similar notions. These can 
now be investigated for the potentially dehumanizing consequences which take 
the gloss off the bounty of consumer goods and services.
Secondly, the appeal to the notion of living well as the key to a genuinely critical 
but empirically accurate account of consumer capitalist consumption insinuates 
the centrality of the issue of consumption for human ecology. Human ecology 
is an investigation of human–environment interactions motivated by a concern 
to determine how these can be reorganized along lines that secure sustainability 
while facilitating living well. But all human–environment interactions are 
ultimately undertaken because they serve some kind of (end-)consumption, 
whether the particular interaction at issue be food supply or rest and recreation. 
So by its very nature human ecology considers human–environment interactions 
as a unity of production and consumption—more precisely, as a sequence 
15 In Meister Eckhart’s sense of the term—what he calls Gelassenheit, which has connotations not just of 
self-composure but of self-surrender, that is, the capacity to put on hold one’s own preoccupation and concern 
with oneself in order to be able to see how things really are, hence what really matters. Self-surrender in this 
sense is clearly an essential feature of fully rational decision-making.
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of acts of production enabling acts of (end-)consumption. Practices of (end-)
consumption are therefore not just contingently a matter for human ecological 
empirical investigation.16
Philosophical foundations in an ontology  
of self
The claim that human ecology seeks knowledge useful for transforming 
human–environment interactions in the direction of sustainable living well 
would be little more than a slogan had one no principled, theoretical means for 
determining what it meant, in the specific circumstances under investigation, 
for rational animals such as we are to live well. One would be forced to rely 
on pre-philosophical intuitions about what concretely realized, from case to 
case, the formal structure of living well and such reliance would run the risk 
of tendentiously favoring certain concrete forms of life and culture over others. 
Thus, precisely in order to make the notion of living well concrete enough to 
guide action yet not so concrete as to become a tendentious imposition, human 
ecology requires a certain kind of philosophical grounding. Specifically, it needs 
an account of rational animality itself, an account which would identify certain 
concrete features of which it argued that all forms of living well must exhibit 
them. Appeal to such features could then guide practical political engagement 
without fear of tendentiousness.
Now under the plausible assumption that self-conscious subjectivity and 
rationality requires animality—that is, embodiment in the sense of a capacity 
both for bodily action and for affective response (feeling, sentiment, emotion, 
hence vulnerability)—a philosophical account of rational animality would be 
nothing less than a strictly philosophical ontology of the self, its subjectivity, 
and its rationality.17 The goal of this ontology would be twofold. Firstly, it would 
seek to elaborate and justify the claim implicit in Section 2 that reflectiveness, 
social and political engagement, and inner composure are the conditions under 
which the defining capacity of creatures capable of living well, namely reason,18 
is optimally exercised, hence are essential features of living well. Evidently, 
these features prescribe no concrete form of life. Yet they are not so abstract as 
to permit no inference to operationalizable guidelines for the development of 
16 Nor is it surprising that human ecologists, when they seek to identify what current human–environment 
interactions lack, should so readily turn to notions of enoughness (Genügsamkeit), sufficiency and the like.
17 Demonstrating this assumption would indeed be a principal task for such an ontology of self.
18 It follows trivially from the characterization of the formal structure of living well given here that one can 
only live well if one is capable of ethical judgement and deliberation. For this reason, as Aristotle points out, 
only rational animals can live well. Of course, as he also points out, animals not capable of self-consciousness 
and rationality, for example, oxen, can lead pleasurable, pain-free lives. But they cannot be happy in Aristotle’s 
sophisticated sense.
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political programs and policies. Thus, secondly, on the basis of its neither too 
abstract nor too concrete understanding of living well, the envisaged ontology 
of self, subjectivity, and rationality would seek to justify both the avoidance 
of complexity and tight coupling, and the need for the slow and for a non-
hubristic precautionary stance towards social and environmental intervention. 
For these it would show to be the collective “mindset” required for creating and 
maintaining the social relations and psychological dispositions which encourage 
reflectiveness, social and political engagement, and inner composure.
Implicit in these two interrelated goals is an important specific task required of 
the envisaged ontology. In Section 1 it was pointed out how, on the conception of 
it sketched there, human ecology was committed to exploring the possibilities of 
potentially quite radical behavioral change, up to and including the identification 
of how those involved in problematic interaction might be brought not to 
desire and not to feel in the manner driving this interaction. Now everyday, 
pre-theoretical experience already testifies that the desires and affectivities of 
distinctively self-conscious, at least moderately rational subjects are not brute, 
unchangeable facts of animal constitution, such that nothing can ever change 
them. Equally, however, it suggests that such desires and affectivities are not 
simply artifacts of external, hence purely externally manipulable conditions, for 
example, the socioeconomic, technologically mediated practices of consumption 
in which one participates.19 In some sense, then, changing them in a more 
sustainable direction requires intervening to change the internal psychological 
constitution of the subject itself. But what kind of intervention? Some kind of 
engineering intervention, such as brainwashing or the administration of drugs? 
Quite apart from its dubious morality, any such psychoengineering is unlikely 
to be effective.
For this reason, it was also claimed in Section 1 that human ecology presupposes 
human beings to have, at least to some sufficient degree, their desires and 
affectivities under their rational control, such that they can themselves 
rationally reconfigure their patterns of desire and affect. Human ecology 
therefore presupposes an account of how this can be so. The envisaged ontology 
of self and subjectivity must include an ontology of desire and affect which 
shows first that, as distinctively self-conscious subjects, human beings do 
have such rational control; and second, in a manner in which our everyday, 
pre-theoretical experience cannot show, under what conditions and in what 
ways human beings can exercise this rational control. This ontology would 
thus describe the nature and extent of the capacity to rationally reconfigure 
patterns of desire and affective response in the light of the knowledge human 
ecology provides as to the unsustainability of, for example, current practices of 
consumption and the hints it gives as to more sustainable alternatives which, 
19 Shove (2003) seems rather inclined to this view.
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once habituated to them, we would find to be forms of living at least as well, if 
not better. What mechanisms of social and psychological compensation must be 
in place in order for the transition to new, more sustainable forms of desire and 
affectivity to be so tolerable—which is not to say painless—that one can reliably 
expect individuals to embark upon it? Evidently, the ontology envisaged here 
constitutes the distinctively philosophical component of and contribution to 
a theory of behavioral change. Such a theory would clearly be of importance 
to the practicing human ecologist since, as already pointed out, patterns of 
desire and affect play a crucial causal role in currently unsustainable human–
environment interactions. Human ecology must therefore seek to understand 
these patterns as well, and to do so with a view to suggesting how they, too, 
might be changed for the better.
Finally, implicit in the conception of human ecology sketched here lies a 
decisive metatask for this strictly philosophical account of self and subjectivity. 
Everything said thus far entails that human ecology understands not just itself 
but also the humans it investigates as governed by a distinctive practical interest 
in living well. More precisely, it entails that human beings are, in their capacity 
as rational animals, essentially oriented towards living well: This is what it is 
for us to be most fully or optimally as the rational animals we are. The essential 
character of this orientation explains why all normal, nonpsychopathic human 
beings would acknowledge living well as the optimal way to live for rational 
animals even though they themselves may believe they do not have the moral 
character to do so. It also explains the truth of the claim that most people are not 
affectively indifferent to right and wrong: most could not be psychopaths but 
would prefer to do the right thing and will do so provided the costs are not too 
high. In other words, most people will not ruthlessly seek their own advantage 
at all cost but will sooner make some sacrifice, however small, in order to do 
the right thing. Claims such as these create space for something desperately 
needed in these times of growing eco-despair and -resignation:20 faith in the 
capacity of human beings to deal effectively with such enormous crises as the 
environmental one. Given this, it becomes imperative to ground, as an essential 
structure of self and subjectivity, that orientation towards living well which 
entails the truth of these claims.
20 For an example of a powerful manifestation of this, see http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/. 
Admittedly, just how despairing the Dark Mountain Project really is remains unclear—this because it remains 
chronically unclear about just what it is rejecting: environmental or ecopolitics, no matter how radical, or 
merely the light-green panglossian and technocratic politics of government and business.
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Conclusion
Claims that human ecology is multi-, inter-, trans-, and even adisciplinary 
are not just unclear, they are disconcerting. For if human ecology is all these 
things, and in particular the latter two, then how can it be anything coherent 
at all? Is it not rather, as its opponents in academia might allege, a mere 
hotchpotch of investigations into human–environment interactions which try 
to be both natural and social science without succeeding at either? Evidently, 
these worries and allegations presuppose that the notion of discipline has a 
fairly specific sense. In particular, the notion cannot be understood so broadly 
that any cognitive practice will count as a discipline since human ecology is 
obviously a cognitive practice, with its own conventions, congresses, journals, 
professional networks, and the like. What, then, is a discipline? Surely it is a 
cognitive practice with an inherently recursive character: a discipline possesses 
a stable body of agreed-upon results from which current practitioners can and 
must proceed as an accepted basis for further research, whereby they generate 
further agreed-upon results from which subsequent practitioners can and must 
proceed, who in turn generate further agreed-upon results ... and so on, ad 
indefinitum.
No doubt all cognitive practices conventionally regarded as disciplines only 
approximate to this ideal. And no doubt some practices approach it better than 
others. Certainly, different types of discipline approach it in very different 
ways—for example, English literature as opposed to molecular biology. Human 
ecology, however, has surely not approached it very much at all. But if human 
ecology is inherently philosophical, both in the sense that in some phases of its 
activity it is philosophy and in the sense that it is directly reliant on a strictly 
philosophical account of self and subjectivity, then one should neither be 
surprised nor disturbed by this fact. For philosophy only is what it is, and does 
what it does, by resisting normalization as a recursively structured discipline. 
This obviously does not mean that it is not a genuinely cognitive practice with 
a crucial role to play in human culture and advancement. In fact, precisely in its 
non-normalisability, philosophy is that essential complement to disciplinarity 
without which the totality of cognitive practice would not be able to radically 
recast itself—precisely into new disciplines very different from existing ones. 
Seen in this light, human ecology becomes the distinctively philosophical 
appropriation of the results of whatever disciplines, techniques, and indeed 
pre-theoretical, everyday knowledge are needed for providing human society 
not just with the knowledge but also with the conceptual flexibility it needs in 
order to generate a creative practical response to the most serious crises human 
beings have ever confronted.
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The task then becomes that of applying this conception of human ecology 
as philosophy to specific issues—centrally, of course, to the critical study of 
consumption but also to many other issues. One such further issue would be the 
critical study of production, that is, work and its potentially alienated forms in 
late modern capitalist society. Another would be the conceptual analysis of key 
concepts used in characterizing human–environment interactions, for example, 
the urban, the rural, the natural, and the wild, which could be deepened to 
include reflection on such fundamental ontological categories as those of 
biophysical limit, system, and causation. Of highly topical political relevance 
would be the analysis of the legitimacy and limits of growing social tendencies 
to eco-resignation, as illustrated by the Dark Mountain Project.21 Last but not 
least, there is the critical investigation of mainstream understandings of what 
problems of sustainability are and how to solve them—more bluntly put, of 
technocratic thinking. These all represent new and exciting issues for members 
of the human ecology community to work on into the future.
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